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Abstract
If  we consider that  (1) mental  i l lness is  related to learning and (2) learning happens in a
rela t ional  context  between the  subject  and his /her  environment ,  we could s ta te  that  i t  i s
possible that a change in the context means changes in subject’s health. Therefore, an approxi-
mation to the concept of «cure»1 may include the idea of form and re-form a thought habit and
ambit (a pattern of learned behaviour that could be transferred to another space which can be
influenced or not by the context involved), which, in turn, can affect the person’s quality of
life of the. We assume that by modifying a though habit the subject can change his/her situa-
tion and that can mean an improvement in his/her relationships with the environment tending
to the re-equilibration, which, in turn, benefits subject’s health. In this work we developed this
hypothesis and show empiric evidence that support our assumptions.
Key words: functional analysis, learning context, "cure", habit and ambit
Introducción
Despite of being associated with the mind-
body separation, which is non-founded, mental
health is not a one-discipline patrimony but is an
area which crosses through different fields of
knowledge, such as cognitive anthropology, medi-
cine, psychology, pedagogy and others. In the case
of cognitive anthropology the aim is to elucidate
the underlined principles of behaviour assuming
that each person (and culture) has its own system
of perception and organization of the world-envi-
ronment.
Mental health is one of the main aspects
of human behaviour characterized by a series
of standards. We understand that behaviour is
a term which designs the actions that organis-
ms exert on their external environment to mo-
dify some of their states or to change their
relationship with the environment (Piaget, 1978).
The notion of vection (Piaget, 1977) means the
increasingly wide opening to new possibilities
of interaction with the environment, an increa-
se in open behavioural adaptations which tends
to expand the cognoscibility and liveability of
the environment.
While the occurrence of internal movements,
such as blood circulation, and the changes produ-
ced by the function of respiration on the atmos-
phere are not understandable as behaviours, we
assume that behaviour tends to modify the rela-
tionships between the organism and its environ-
ment (Piaget, 1978).
Lahitte (1990) explained the difference bet-
ween activity and behaviour because speaking about
behaviour needs to be referred to a context of sig-
nificance: the intentional factor of behaviour makes
it able to be explained in communicational terms.
According to the context of observation the acts
will be behaviour or not because the concept of
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behaviour depends on the distinctions made du-
ring the observation.
The behavioural relationship is not internal
to the subject but it precedes the internal changes.
That means that the understanding of behaviour
through the concept of relationship yields to a
novel logical kind of learning named by Bateson
(1993) deutero-learning.
In this context we address different kind of
learning as changes in behaviour acquired by ex-
perience (frequently repeated experience) which
tends to the adaptation by means of re-equilibra-
tion and self-regulation.
Mental health is closely related to subject’s
learning:
«Lo que en algún momento entendía-
mos como enfermedad o patología o desvia-
ción social son, en realidad, nuevas
propiedades que adquieren los seres huma-
nos cuando alteran su condición de equili-
brio. Estas formas que podríamos entender
como nuevas propiedades se estabilizan como
patologías en las que el sistema, el sujeto en
su conjunto es sometido a fuertes condicio-
namientos del medio (relacional, familiar, es-
colar…).» (Lahitte y Ortiz Oria, 2005: 89)
If we consider that (1) mental illness is
related to learning and (2) learning happens in
a relational context between the subject and
his/her environment, we could state that it is
possible that a change in the context means
changes in subject’s health. Therefore, an
approximation to the concept of «cure»1 may
include the idea of form and re-form a thought
habit and ambit (a pattern of learned behaviour
that could be transferred to another space whi-
ch can be influenced or not by the context in-
volved), which, in turn, can affect the person’s
quality of life of the. We assume that by modi-
fying a though habit the subject can change his/
her situation and that can mean an improve-
ment in his/her relationships with the environ-
ment tending to the re-equilibration, which, in
turn, benefits subject’s health.
In this work we developed this hypothesis
and show empiric evidence that support our as-
sumptions.
Learning contexts, cognition
and problem solving
It is important to make a difference among
the terms instinct, habit and custom. There is very
few instincts because everything which is learned
and has purpose is not an instinct.
There are five learning contexts which are
grouped as follows: positive learning (learning to
do), and negative learning (learning to inhibit ac-
tions). Two kinds of stimuli are present in both of
them, conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. The
five learning context to which we are reference
are: (a) problem solving, (b) pavlovian, (c) instru-
mental reward, (d) instrumental avoiding, and (e)
serial or mnemonic.
Learning context form thought habits which
in the subject work as behavioural premises once
formed. We assume that thought habits depend on
contexts and stimuli and if we change any of them
the habit can become flexible.
Proto-learning and deutero-learning are
two kinds of learning gradients. We use pro-
to-learning or first-order learning (Bateson,
1972/1998) to refer to classic and instrumen-
tal conditioning, and mnemonic learning. Cero-
learning or the reception of signals or external
information is a kind of learning which prece-
des proto-learning. Finally, deutero-learning
or second-order learning is a kind of learning
which arises as a proto-learning gradient when
we apply some repetition or practice on the
same issue, as a result of what the execution
time or the quantity of mistakes improve pro-
gressively. Therefore, we can develop patter-
ns of behaviour which can be transferred to
other contexts. This is named learning to learn
or deutero-learning.
At this point we should state what the me-
aning of cognition for us is. According to Héctor
Lahitte (Lahitte, 1995; Lahitte, 2005) the aim of
the anthropologists who work on cognitive an-
thropology is to notice the observation points
from which the ens universale is configured and
expressed in each society, which generates a cog-
nitive style (Maruyama, 1980, 1992), a general
vision shared by every people from this society.
The term cognition designs such questions: in a
figured sense cognition means what is configu-
red, what is build.
1 It is important to say that we are presenting an anthropological article as a contribution to an integral and
interdisciplinary view of the mental illness but that we are not able to write as if we have the specific knowledge
of medicine; therefore we write «cure» between quotation marks.
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According to Alan Kamil (from Lahitte, 2006),
cognition involves some kind of internal repre-
sentation of the external world and the organiza-
tion of sensorial information in internal models.
Depending on the circumstances where we cogni-
tion is looking to be found, it can be understood as
adaptation and neither makes sense in context of
maximum variability (to have an internal map does
not make a sense if the territory is constantly
changing) nor in zero variability contexts.
What is characteristic of human cognition
(Tomasello, 2000) is the quality to aggregate cog-
nitive resources in an original manner.  Human
cultural learning is different from other kind of
social learning and includes learning by imitation,
learning by instruction and collaborative learning.
These three kinds of cultural learning depend on a
particular form of social cognition, which is the
people ability to understand the others as them-
selves, with intentionality and mental life. This
ability makes people able to put themselves in
the other place «so that they can learn not just
from the other but through the other.» (Tomase-
llo, 2000: 6)2.
Human cognition, according to Tomasello
(2000), is the result of a kind of specie-specific
cultural transmission.  Traditions and artefacts
incorporate modifications along the time with a
ratchet effect by which some processes cannot go
back once they have happened. The process of
cultural accumulation requires not only the creati-
ve invention but also the social transmission whi-
ch works as a ratchet to avoid regressions and
losses. Therefore, a new practice or artefact pre-
serves its characteristics until a further modifica-
tion improves it and this improvement will be learned
by people, preserved and occasionally modified
and so on.
The dynamic of the instruction-learning linka-
ge let us conceive cognition on a different way:
not centred in the subject but as a result of a
relationship.
According to the assumptions about cogni-
tion written above, learning processes are not ne-
cessarily placed in the brain; conversely, we
understand cognition as an extended process (Clark,
1998, 1999, 2004; Broncano, 2007). We think lear-
ning happens in the subject-context interaction,
due to what we can speak in terms of learning
contexts.
Among the above mentioned learning contexts,
the problem learning context is close related to the
concept of transference. We call transference to
the ability to expand to new contexts what has
been learnt in a given context (Bransford, 2002),
which opens the access to an ample group of pur-
poses and intentions.
We make a distinction between (a) simple,
automatic procedures, and (b) strategic procedu-
res of problem solving, which are a kind of deute-
ro-learning.
The first step in procedural learning is occu-
pied by the techniques and sequences of actions
developed routinely (Pozo, 2000), which are not
single habits learned implicitly by exposition to
a reinforcement or a model but are build by se-
quences of actions learned by repetition until its
automation and by explicit, associative training.
Techniques are useful to cope with exercises.
However, when this simple exercise becomes a
problem by variation in any part of the situa-
tion, it is necessary to develop strategic learning.
This is the second step in procedural learning
and consists in the utilization of techniques in
new or complex situations (problem situations)
where techniques must be adapted to the speci-
fic demands. The acquisition of strategies depends
on constructive learning, instead of associative
learning, in which people develop reflection on
their own practice and the re-elaboration of their
actions according to self-assessment. There is a
special kind of strategy which is to learn learning
strategies or the self-monitoring about the own
learning. This means to learn to use the reflec-
tion about the own knowledge or metacognition.
The higher level of procedural learning is lear-
ning to learn and problem solving supported by
working memory processes (Thompson, 1993;
Lezak, 1995; Gray, 2003).
The concept of cognitive flexibility, or at least
compatibility of cognitive systems, is shown by
observing differences between novices and exper-
ts’ behaviour, which is the key factor for the dis-
tinction between solving an exercise or solving a
single problem and problem solving. The differen-
ce between merely skilled and highly competent
can be observed in a variety of knowledge fields
and implies a kind of flexible expertise. The con-
cept of adaptive expertise   (Hatano & Inagali,
1986, in Bransford, 2002) provides an important
learning model. Adaptive experts are able to appro-
ach to new situation flexibly and they can learn
along their complete lives. They not only use what
they have learnt but also develop their metacogni-
2 Italics are from the original text.
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tion and permanently question their expertise le-
vel in order to surpass to themselves.
The concept of metacognition was originally
introduced in the context of children studies (Brown,
1980; Flavell, 1985, 1991, en Bransford, 2002)
and refers to the ability to self-monitor their pre-
sent comprehension level and to decide when it is
not adequate (Bransford, 2002).
Daily problem solving involves cognitive pro-
cesses related to the access and manipulation of
the previous knowledge relevant to an actual pro-
blem, the generation of appropriate strategies, the
inhibition of inappropriate or routine responses
and the ability to judge the efficiency of the solu-
tion. Furthermore, daily problem solving involves
emotional and social abilities. These daily proble-
ms share some properties with neuropsychologi-
cal problem solving tasks applied in laboratories,
in which the sequence can be characterized by re-
cognition, difference-distinction, and type. Howe-
ver, daily problems differ from laboratory ones in
that they present a low defined structure, they
may have an open and relative end, the existence
of competent proprieties depending on the con-
text, and the necessity of include the others’ point
of view and to have an adequate social-contextual
knowledge. Furthermore, the potential consequences
of solution alternatives should be examined and
pondered (Channon, 2004).
Cerebral fontal dysfunction can be associa-
ted with difficulties in several problem solving
aspects including working memory; for example,
as a result of a memory deficit in the generation of
search strategies it can be observed a decrement in
the efficiency of using previous knowledge (Chan-
non, 2004).
Behavioural disturbances associated with
frontal lobe lesion can be summarised as follows
(Baddeley, 1999; Lezak, 1995): 1. Initiation pro-
blems: a decrement in a rate of behaviour emis-
sion and a decrement or complete loss of initiative,
a loss of spontaneity and productivity, and, so-
metimes, apathy, muteness or the absence of res-
ponse (respect to some reference from the
observer); 2. Perseveration and difficulties in
making mental or behavioural shifts; 3. Trouble
finishing: loss of control, impulsivity, over-reac-
tivity, disinhibition and difficulties to avoid wrong,
not appropriate answers, which are frequently
part of a current chain response; 4. Deficit in
self-consciousness: problems with self-criticism,
incapacity to see execution mistakes, problems
in appreciate the impact of the self on others and
adequately evaluate a social situation; the sense
of the self in people with frontal lesions seems
to be affected; and 5. Concreteness: incapacity
to dissociate to themselves from the immediate
context, in which objects, experiences and beha-
viours are understood  from their most obvious
aspect, yielding to an incapacity to plan and sus-
tain a behaviour driven by objectives. Although
several of these patients show an inability to
manipulate abstract concepts, others preserve a
high degree of conceptual abilities in spite of their
loss of perspective and literal consideration (Le-
zak, 1995).
Problem solving in a mnemonic learning
context with people with amnesic and
executive deficits: is it possible?
Tower tasks involve problem solving func-
tions and transference in which the examinee must
rearrange some discs or little balls by a minimal
number of movements in order to make them ma-
tch with the model or reach the established final
objective.
Developed on the basis of the Simon’s model
of the Tower of Hanoi, tower tasks serve to as-
sess executive functions and problem solving. It
is agreed that they primarily involve planning
(Anderson, 2001; Lezak, 1995; Newman, 2003;
Riccio, 2004; Spreen, 1998): if people plan move-
ments and visualise solutions in advance it is sup-
posed that they would develop a more efficient
problem solving strategy.
Tower tasks have rules to follow to reach the
final solution which have different structures and
ways of assessing execution and vary along the
different versions of the tower as well (Riccio,
2004).
The process of solution of tower tasks syn-
thesises two theories about executive functions
(Newman, 2003)3: Shallice’s theory which was
published in 1982 (Baddeley, 1999; Newman, 2003)
and Newell’s theory which was published in 1990
(Newman, 2003).
According to the first theory, there are two
cognitive control paths in executive functions: (a)
routine-like, bottom-up and perceptually driven and
(b) strategic, top-down and driven by objectives.
3 Even though Newman refers specifically to the Tower of London, we consider that his hypothesis can be
expanded to similar tower tasks like the Tower of Hanoi.
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On the other hand, Newell’s theory poses
that problem solving involves a cyclic process of
four stages: (a) deliberation, in which all the alte-
rative operators are considered in parallel, (b) pre-
ferences computation between different operators,
which Lahitte (1981) calls learning in increasing
complexity, (c) decision making to select the best
operator and (d) application of the selected ope-
rator to the current state. However, if any one of
the preconditions to apply the operator is not
satisfied, it will be necessary to put forward sub-
objectives to reach the preconditions before
applying the selected operator.
The two models, Shallice’s and Newell’s
theories, work together because while the ordina-
ry approach to solve the tower is guided percep-
tually, trying to reduce the range between the initial
state and the goal state (without taking into ac-
count the achievement of preconditions), the stra-
tegic approach creates sub-objectives to satisfy
preconditions (although they can enlarge the per-
ceptual distance between the initial and the final
state of the tower). Once the preconditions are
satisfied, the perceptual mode takes back the con-
trol to apply the original perceptual operator.
It has been suggested that thinking aloud can
help people solve the tower. Instead of represen-
ting a mere verbalisation, thinking aloud might be
some form of metacognition to produce a self-
explanation of the process to reach the solution
(Noyes, 2003). We could illustrate this in the fo-
llowing example with the Tower of Hanoi (see
below for details of our research). The patient can
use the technique of thinking aloud without meta-
cognition (a mere verbalisation) if they say «this
ring here, the other there» and «the little ring on
the bigger» but their action is dissociated from
what he/she is saying. Instead, if patient’s words
help him/her to understand that they are making a
wrong movement and thanks to this comprehen-
sion they can change the strategy, they are using
thinking aloud as a metacognitive technique.
Considering the depicted conditions in tower
tasks, it would be supposed that patients with
anterograde amnesia (sometimes retrograde too)
and executive problems such as people with
Korsakoff’s syndrome should not be able to learn
to solve the task neither in a mnemonic learning
context (proto-learning) not by the highest level
of deutero-learning.
We worked with Korsakoff’s patients lear-
ning to solve the Tower of Hanoi (Anderson, 1995,
2001; Lezak, 1995; Spreen, 1998).
One of the most important characteristic of
problems solving tasks is the searching of a se-
quence of steps that let solvers to pass from the
current state to the target one (Anderson, 1995),
in which planning is the main process.  The Tower
of Hanoi is useful to measure the subject’s plan-
ning during a problem solving process. In this
task we have a platform with three axes (A, B,
and C) and a number of rings which differ in their
diameter piled from the biggest (at the bottom of
the axis A) to the smallest (at the top of the same
axis). The problem is how to form the same pile
in axe C following two rules: (a) to move the
rings one by one and (b) never to arrange a bigger
ring on a smaller one.  The Tower of Hanoi has
been applied during four repeating sessions with
an interval from session to session of one to se-
ven days (Spreen, 1998), which let researchers
observe several issues such as the development
of a solution strategy, the storage of success and
failures during the resolution, and the benefit the
patient takes from their own experience. This
model of tower tasks has been applied as a pro-
blem solving and executive functions test (Num-
minen, 2001).
In our research we used a commercial ver-
sion of the Tower of Hanoi (Ruibal S.R.L.). We
supposed that the subjects who worked with the
Tower along the training sessions, provided an
adequate pedagogical support, would be able to
solve increasingly complex instances. We unders-
tand that an adequate pedagogical support should
be a kind of teaching which (a) works according
to cognitive neuroscience and the relational fra-
mework of the anthropology, (b) take care of the
diversity and (c) generates the effective didactic
tools.  We define the level of complexity by the
quantity of rings people is working with, for exam-
ple if the patient is working with five rings the
level of complexity is five. Two crucial issues in
our research are: 1. The possibility to learn to
solve the task (independently from the quantity
of movements and the time consumed in the task),
and 2. The quantity of movements of the execu-
tion: it is supposed that least amount of move-
ments with successful execution gives rise to a
higher execution efficacy.
Results from our research showed that du-
ring the pre-test the patients were incapable to
solve the tower with a five-ring complexity. Pre-
test consisted in a single session of traditional as-
sessment, in which the role of the examiner (M.A.
Bacigalupe) was limited to explain to the patients
the rules and the task objective with no other kind
of intervention but the observation of the patients’
behaviour.  This mnemonic learning context can be
called «traditional context».
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During the training sessions the same exami-
ner worked with the patients following the pre-
cepts of dynamic assessment, beginning the practise
with a minimal number of rings and progressively
increasing the level of complexity by adding more
rings according to the particularities of each patient’s
execution. This increment in complexity was de-
veloped by an adequate guidance and intervention
from the examiner.  We called this learning context
as «dynamic context». Along the sessions the pa-
tients were able to improve not only the level of
complexity and completeness of the task but also
their self-monitoring.
The post-test consisted in a similar session
than the pre-test but each patient was asked to
solve the tower with the level of complexity that
they had reached during the training. This means
that if they had solved the tower successfully with
three rings and not with four or five rings, the
post-test consisted in solving the tower with three
rings.
These results allow us to conclude that the
patients not only learned the task (proto-learning)
but also improved their execution with practise
and training (deutero-learning) and reached some
level of flexibility and metacognition, which was
different from patient to patient.
Conclusions
Along this work we understand the concept
of cognition as a mediated, expanded function;
therefore we are making an essential methodologi-
cal and epistemological decision, which involves
not only consequences on the philosophy of mind
and cognitive sciences but also social and ethical
derivations.
One of the consequences of the delineated
perspective is the role of educators as learning
mediators or vygotskyan scaffolds, working on
the subject’s zone of proximal development and
promoting an active inclusion of people in their
culture.
Another consequence of this perspective can
be found in medical sciences, in which a systemic
point of view can consider that people are not ill
per se but they are ill only in relation to their
environment. This means that the concept of health
and illness depend on a given cultural perspecti-
ve. Therefore, medical sciences are interested not
only in the patient but also in their environment,
and look for the social and physical factors which
can influence the loss of the equilibrium that fre-
quently defines the term health.
To delineate an idea of «mental health» requi-
res two explanations: 1. To understand the sys-
tem as healthy or ill, according to the diagnostic
criteria of «normality» and «abnormality», and 2.
The researcher should accept that the criteria of
«normality» and «abnormality» are closely rela-
ted to a consensus on acceptances and rejections
of given behaviours; these behaviours arise from a
co-existence of consensual coordination.
This means that «the idea of mental health»
is only understandable in the ambit of the social
dynamic which delineates it. In other words, this
idea depends on the subject or subjects that expe-
rience it and the context of recurrent emotional
contradictions. This form of learning and showing
emotions is which finally can or cannot make people
ill.
Attempting to link learning and «cure», and
attempting to comprehend whether a cognitive
system works adequately, means that understand
when and how somebody’s behaviour becomes part
of a world of meaning which is pre-existent or
new and agreed.
It is relevant to this perspective to say that
representations have no more a central role, that
the «intelligence» is no more the responsible to
solve a problem or manipulate several material
resources, though it is the capacity to enter in a
shared world. This means that we are beyond the
measurement of the benefit of changes in the scale
and time of the performance in the resolution of
specific tasks. Our point of view goes beyond in
the same direction but abandoning the temporali-
ty to live in a shared world from where emerges
the social phenomenon.
The goal is to find an endogenous activity
which matches with the optimal codification of
the environmental regularity. In a few words, to
find a cognitive system in which the endogenous
phenomenon and the exogenous one are defined
by a viable coupling.
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